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I. INTRODUCTION
Given the venue of this speech, I must immediately offer a disclaimer:
I am not now, nor have I ever been, a Catholic.  Nonetheless, it is a
Pope—Gelasius the First, to be precise—with whom I begin. In 494
A.D., Gelasius declared that the world is ruled under two heads: “the 
consecrated authority of priests and the royal power.”1  Two years later, 
he elaborated this idea.  Christ himself, Gelasius said, “made a distinction
between the two rules, assigning each its sphere of operation and its due 
respect.”2  The emperor governs “human,” that is, “secular,” affairs, while
* © 2014 William A. Galston.  Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution. Twenty-Ninth 
Nathaniel L. Nathanson Memorial Lecture, University of San Diego School of Law,
April 4, 2013.
1. NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, THE MIGHTY AND THE ALMIGHTY 134 (2012) (quoting 
FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS 179 (Oliver O’Donovan & Joan Lockwood O’Donovan 
eds., 1999).
























    
 
 
the Pope has governance over “divine affairs” or—otherwise put— 
“spiritual activity.”3 
It hardly needs saying that what came to be known as the doctrine of
“two rules” has undergone many vicissitudes since it was set forth more
than 1500 years ago.  The Reformation reconfigured the relation between
church and state, and political theorists from Machiavelli to Rousseau
and beyond have labored to overcome the challenge to civil power that 
the presence of religious authority inevitably produces.  Nonetheless, the 
core of the Gelasian view survives and makes its way to the contemporary 
West, not the least in the United States. 
Consider, for example, the words from James Madison’s famous 
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, one of the 
foundational documents of our religious liberties: “It is the duty of every
man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes 
to be acceptable to him.”4  And, Madison goes on to say, “This duty is 
precedent both in order of time and degree of obligation to the claims of
civil society.”5 
Madison’s views track those of many believers—in his time and
ours—who consider themselves to be subject to two authorities, one human 
and the other divine.  In some, but not necessarily all, cases of conflict
between them, the faithful believe that God’s authority is paramount. 
The Madisonian conception of conscience thus establishes a basis for 
conscientious objections to laws and regulations that individuals regard 
as going beyond appropriate bounds, and also for demands that civil 
authorities “accommodate” what conscience dictates.
Madison’s claim has forced American policymakers and judges to
confront a number of challenging questions.  What do we mean by
conscience anyway?  Is it exclusively religious, or can it have secular
roots as well?  And how wide is the writ of conscience when it runs up 
against duly enacted civil law? In a few minutes, I will address the 
evolution of conscience in theology and philosophy.  But I want to start 
out closer to practical life.
As many of you know, American jurisprudence has wrestled with the 
challenge of conscience for most of the past century.  Two issues have
proved pivotal.  First, are all conscientious claims against the state religious,
or are some rooted in secular philosophy and morality?  And second, 
how broad are the claims against state power—if any—that conscience
warrants?
3. Id. (quoting FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS, supra note 1, at 179). 
4. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 
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Taken together, these two positions generate four alternatives. The 
scope of conscience can be either narrow—restricted to religion—or
broad—extending beyond religion, and the writ of conscience over against 
civil law can be either strong—warranting numerous exemptions and 
accommodations—or weak—warranting few or none.6 
I have represented these four alternatives in the following figure: In 
the upper left quadrant is a conception of conscience restricted to religion 
coupled with a strong conception of conscientious claims; in the bottom 
right quadrant is a wide view of conscience with weak or no claims; and
the two remaining quadrants are wide/strong and restricted/weak,
respectively. 
6. See infra note 7 and accompanying text. 
3
  












.....,. Vie tnam -era draft cases 



















"' 5 Anti -conscience view -
-
The logic of Smith 
{Smith) 
FIGURE 17 
In the middle decades of the twentieth century, the prevailing view 
combined a narrow conception of conscience—restricted to religion— 
7. See, e.g., Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that Oregon’s 
prohibition of sacramental peyote use was consistent with the Free Exercise Clause); see 
also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970) (holding that exemption “from 
military service [applies to] all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, 
ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves 
to become a part of an instrument of war”); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165–
66 (1965) (holding that “the test of belief ‘in a relation to a Supreme Being’ is whether a 
given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor 
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the 
exemption [from military service]”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (holding 
that South Carolina may not restrict public welfare benefits by criteria that require “a 
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with a capacious understanding of conscientious claims as warranting, in
suitable circumstances, exemption from generally valid public laws.8  This 
view then came under pressure, from two directions.  During the Vietnam 
era, in response to claims for exemption from the draft, the Supreme
Court expanded the perimeter of conscience to include explicitly secular 
beliefs.9 
In 1990, the other shoe dropped.  In a decision that has remained
controversial ever since, Justice Antonin Scalia rejected a claimed
exemption from drug laws for peyote used in Native American religious 
rituals.10  Granting this claim, he argued, would create a system “in
which each conscience is a law unto itself.”11  A society that did this
would be “courting anarchy.”12 
It was not the expansive concept of conscience that worried Scalia; it
was the core meaning of “actions thought to be religiously commanded.”13 
The more religiously diverse the society, the more such actions there
will be, covering an ever-greater sphere of social life and public law. 
Acting through their elected representatives, the people may carve out 
exceptions for religious individuals and institutions.  But religion does 
not enjoy exemption from law as a matter of constitutional or moral
right. Nor, a fortiori, do claims based on secular conscience.
No exemptions as a matter of right is roughly the position many 
contemporary philosophers end up defending as well.14  Does it  make  
sense?  To motivate the discussion, I begin with three controversies: two
are current, and the third is historical.  I proceed to discuss what we might 
mean by conscience in religion, philosophy, and law.  Against that backdrop,
I assess the “no exemptions” position in two ways—constitutionally and 
8. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403–06 (“[A]ppellant’s conscientious objection to 
Saturday work constitutes no conduct prompted by religious principles of a kind within 
the reach of state legislation.”).
9. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 356 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[H]aving chosen to exempt, 
[Congress] cannot draw the line between theistic or nontheistic religious beliefs on the 
one hand and secular beliefs on the other.  Any such distinctions are not, in my view, 
compatible with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”).
10. Emp’t Div., 494 U.S. at 890. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 888. 
13. Id. 
14. See, e.g., BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE 
OF MULTICULTURALISM 50–54 (2001) (describing the effects of retaining a law while 

























philosophically.  I conclude that the claims of conscience, though far
from absolute, are stronger than what either the contemporary Supreme 
Court or secular-oriented philosophers are willing to concede. 
II. THREE CONTROVERSIES 
In September of 2011, the University of Medicine and Dentistry of
New Jersey announced that all nurses employed in the hospital it runs 
would have to help with abortion patients before and after the procedure, 
“reversing a long-standing policy exempting employees who refuse based 
on religious or moral objections.”15  In October, a group of objecting
nurses filed a federal lawsuit.16  In November, U.S. District Court Judge
Jose Linares granted a request for a temporary restraining order barring 
the hospital from requiring the objecting nurses to undergo any “training, 
procedures or performances relating to abortions.”17  In December, the
hospital backed down, agreeing that nurses with conscientious objections 
would not have to assist with pre- or post-operative care for abortions
except when the mother’s life is threatened and no other nonobjecting
staff are available to assist.18 
Here is a second controversy: On January 20, 2012, the Department of
Health and Human Services announced a final rule specifying preventive 
health services that most new insurance plans would be required to cover 
under the Affordable Care Act.19  Contraceptives and sterilizations were 
listed as required services, including drugs such as Plan B and Ella.20 
The Department provided a narrow exemption from this rule for certain
religious entities such as churches, but this exemption did not exempt 
15. Rob Stein, N.J. Nurses Sue over Abortion Policy, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2011, 
at A2.
16. Verified Complaint at 1–2, Danquah v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, No. 11– 
cv–06377 (JLL) (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2011), available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/
DanquahComplaint.pdf. 
17. Temporary Restraining Order at 2, Danquah, No. 11–cv–06377 (JLL), available 
at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/DanquahTRO.pdf. 
18. Transcript of Proceedings at 11–14, 16–17, Danquah, No. 11–cv–06377 
(JLL), available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/DanquahSettlementTranscripts.pdf. 
19. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., A Statement by U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius (Jan. 20, 2012), 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/01/20120120a.html. 
20. See id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves 
Ella Tablets for Prescription Emergency Contraception (Aug. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm222428.htm; Press 
Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves Plan B One-Step Emergency
Contraceptive for Use Without a Prescription for All Women of Child Bearing Potential 
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most religiously affiliated universities, hospitals, and social service 
agencies.21 
Cardinal Timothy Dolan, President of the United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, swiftly condemned this decision: “Never before . . . 
has the federal government forced individuals and organizations to go
out into the marketplace and buy a product that violates their conscience.
This shouldn’t happen in a land where free exercise of religion ranks 
first in the Bill of Rights.”22  John Garvey, President of the Catholic 
University of America, argued that the mandate “requires us to contradict in
our actions the very lessons that we’re teaching with our words in classes
and in our daily activities at the university.  It makes us hypocrites in
front of the students that we’re trying to educate.”23 
I draw my third controversy from what was perhaps the least successful 
constitutional experiment in American history. 
The Eighteenth Amendment was ratified on January 16, 1919.24  It was 
widely understood that without the concurrent legislation authorized in 
Section 2, the general prohibition on the manufacture, sale, and 
transportation of alcoholic beverages would be too vague to enforce.25 
On October 29, 1919, the National Prohibition Act—popularly known as 
the Volstead Act, which created the legal definition of intoxicating 
liquor and specified penalties for producing it—passed over President
Wilson’s veto and stood as the law of the land until 1933.26 
21. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 19; Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Administration Issues Final Rules on 
Contraception Coverage and Religious Organizations (June 28, 2013), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/06/20130628a.html (stating that nonprofit religious 
organizations can object on religious grounds to contraception but coverage will be 
separately provided to women enrolled in their health plans at no additional cost).
22. Laurie Goodstein, Church Battle over Mandate Was at Ready, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 10, 2012, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
23. Obama Administration, Catholic Leaders Clash over Contraception Mandate
(PBS television broadcast Feb. 6, 2012), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
bb/religion/jan-june12/catholics_02-06.html. 
24. JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789–1995 app. B at 361 (1996). 
25. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2 (repealed 1933) (“The Congress and the
several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”). 
26. See National Prohibition Act, Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41 Stat. 305, 305–09 (1919), 
repealed by Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act, ch. 740, § 1, Pub. L. No. 74-347,
49 Stat. 872 (1935); see also The Volstead Act, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES: HIST.,



















    
















The Volstead Act created a number of exemptions to the prohibition 
regime, of which two are especially noteworthy.  First, the Act allowed 
physicians to prescribe liquor to individuals for medicinal purposes and
to employ it pursuant to treatment for alcoholism in certified treatment
programs.27  Second, the Act stated that nothing it contained should be
construed as applying to “wines for sacramental purposes or like religious
rites,” and it permitted the sale or transfer of wine to rabbis, ministers,
priests, or officers duly authorized by any church or congregation.28 
Suppose the Act had not exempted physicians.  The omission would
have been subject to criticism on policy grounds, but no one would have
suggested that it ran afoul of constitutional norms.  If the Act had failed
to exempt wine for sacramental purposes, however, there would have 
been both a political firestorm and a First Amendment challenge that almost
certainly would have succeeded.29 
The use of sacramental wine lies at the heart of more than one religion.
The Code of Canon Law of the Catholic Church prescribes that “[t]he
most holy eucharistic sacrifice must be offered with bread and with wine 
in which a little water must be mixed.”30  For its part, Jewish law commands
the drinking of wine during the Passover Seder, specifying not only the 
famous four cups but also a minimum quantity to be consumed—as 
anyone who has attended a Seder knows, there is no maximum.31 
Comprehensive prohibition without exemptions would have prevented 
faithful Jews and Catholics from behaving as their religion requires. The
Constitution’s presumption in favor of free exercise is designed to reduce
to an avoidable minimum the circumstances in which such clashes are
resolved in favor of the state.  If free exercise means anything, it means
the liberty to conduct the mandatory rites of one’s faith.
This liberty is not absolute, of course; there are “side-constraints” on 
its scope and exercise.32  A neo-Aztec religious group could not claim
Apr. 19, 2014) (stating that the Volstead Act passed over President Woodrow Wilson’s 
veto and remained in effect until it was repealed by the Twenty-first Amendment).
27. See National Prohibition Act, 41 Stat. at 310, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. 
XXI (1933).
28. See id. 
29. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
30. 1983 CODE c.924, § 1, reprinted in  NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF 
CANON LAW 1116 (John P. Beal et al. eds., 2000). 
31. See THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JUDAISM 692 (Geoffrey Wigoder et al. eds., 
2002).
32. See Michael J. White, The First Amendment’s Religion Clauses: “Freedom of
Conscience” Versus Institutional Accommodation, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1075, 1097
(2010) (noting that “side-constraints” impose limits of religious toleration) (quoting
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moral or constitutional protection for human sacrifice, however central
to its beliefs that ritual might be. Although adult Christian Scientists 
may spurn standard medical practices, parents may not withhold treatment
when the life of their child is at stake.  A denomination might claim that
God commands it to evangelize, but free exercise does not give it the 
right to conduct a revival meeting at 2:00 AM in a residential neighborhood.
In such circumstances, religious noise is on all fours with its secular
counterpart. 
There are, in short, some bedrock civil concerns that the law may
enforce, regardless of their effects on particular religions.  But for most
of our national history, legislators and jurists distinguished between such
concerns and the more typical objects of legislation, which were thought
to be not so fundamental as to outweigh religious free exercise.  Despite 
the obvious importance of communal self-defense, many colonies exempted 
Quakers from serving in battles against the French and Native Americans,
an exemption that some colonies continued during the Revolutionary
War.33  Madison and the members of the First Congress who crafted the
Bill of Rights were well aware of this history.  Notably, Madison’s original
draft of the First Amendment made explicit reference to liberty of 
conscience.34 
III. CONSCIENCE IN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 
How does the Madisonian view, which has so profoundly shaped 
American policy and jurisprudence, line up with the phenomenon of 
conscience as it has been understood in religion and philosophy? 
Conscience is generally regarded as an inner state or faculty linked to 
an awareness of moral limits and to the ability to distinguish right from 
wrong.35  Different faiths and philosophical creeds offer varying accounts 
of the source of conscience—intuition, reason, natural law, God’s revealed 
law, or an unmediated encounter with the divine.  But they agree that 
33. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1468–69 (1990); see also QUAKER 
CROSSCURRENTS: THREE HUNDRED YEARS OF FRIENDS IN THE NEW YORK YEARLY 
MEETINGS 49–50 (Hugh Barbour et al. eds., 1995) (discussing the role of the Quakers 
during conflicts with the French and Native Americans). 
34. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
35. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 345 (9th ed. 2009) (defining conscience 









    
  
















      
conscience is something individuals experience and invoke as a source 
of moral guidance.  Many traditions, moreover, see conscience as the 
source of the discomfort we feel when we act in ways that we know we
should not and of the self-criticism that attends the violation of obligations
or commands. But conscience is not merely negative.  For millennia,
philosophers as well as pious believers have cited conscience as a source 
of affirmative obligations as well.
Beyond these broad commonalities, faith traditions offer divergent 
accounts of conscience. For Catholics, conscience is a faculty for the 
apprehension of practical truth, including the core propositions of natural 
law.36  Because all human beings are endowed with this faculty and because
practical truth is one and the same for everyone everywhere, conscience 
in principle tends toward agreement.  Catholic thinkers thus encounter 
two challenges—accounting for legitimate conscientious disagreement 
and offering principled grounds for respecting the outcome of conscientious 
but erring moral reflection. 
For their part, Protestants are less likely than Catholics to see conscience 
in close relation to natural law, or indeed to reason. We know only what
God’s grace allows, they say, and human beings experience that grace in
different ways.37  To be sure, for many Protestants, shared communal 
understandings shape the development and content of conscience.38 
Still, conscience has a subjective as well as objective component, based
on what one leading Protestant theologian calls the “free personal ‘center’”
that each individual possesses.39  This freedom contributes to the “last 
best judgment” in moral matters—our resting point after inquiry and 
reflection—that many Protestants and secular thinkers see as the 
manifestation of conscience in action.40  Conversely, there is an obvious
objection to situating conscience too comfortably within communities,
even faith communities: because individual conscience may require
standing up to majorities or authorities within one’s community of 
36. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 395–99 (2d ed. 1994). 
37. See 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 1304 (Jean-Yves Lacoste ed.,
2005) (stating that Protestant “[b]elievers are justified before God not by their works or
their merit, but by grace alone”).
38. See id. at 341 (“Conscience thus becomes the nucleus of personal decision
around which orbit other realities . . . .”).
39. See  DIETRICH VON HILDEBRAND, TRANSFORMATION IN CHRIST 50 (1948)
(stating that truly conscious people can “advance[] over [their] nature [so] that [they] no
longer agree[] implicitly to all its suggestions” by using their free personal centers to
disavow a negative impulse).
40. See  KEVIN D. O’ROURKE & PHILIP J. BOYLE, MEDICAL ETHICS: SOURCES OF 
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origin, any viable account of conscience must make room for a locus of 
moral judgment not reducible to communal norms. 
Although the conception of conscience as individual inner awareness 
fits awkwardly within the framework of Judaism, the idea of religious
conviction as a source of authority against the state is clearly present.
Jews were forbidden to commit three acts—murder, sexual immorality, 
or idolatry—and were to pay for their disobedience with their lives if 
necessary.41 Martyrdom for these three causes—and only for them—is 
called “sanctifying God’s name.”42  Jews resisted and then revolted when
Hellenistic rulers ordered them to bow down before Greek gods, and some
of the most famous rabbis were executed by the Romans after rejecting
orders to cease teaching Jewish law to their students.43 
Conceptions of conscience are found within secular contexts as well. 
Among philosophical traditions, Greek and Roman Stoicism and Immanuel 
Kant’s practical philosophy offer especially well-developed understandings.
For Kant, conscience is rooted in our awareness of the inner freedom
that gives us our inalienable capacity for moral agency.44  Even when we
act so as to degrade others or ourselves, we can never expunge our ability to
judge the wrong we have committed and to act rightly in the future.45 
Secular conscience often manifests itself in professional and institutional
contexts. Becoming a physician means entering into a dense network of 
moral responsibilities to one’s patients and society. At times this creed
sets physicians in opposition to medical authorities and even the law of 
the state.46  Norms of doctor-patient confidentiality can collide with the 
requirements of legal proceedings, and the law does not always exempt 
from disclosure the communications that professionals and their clients
41. See THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JUDAISM, supra note 31, at 457. 
42. See id. (defining martyrdom as “dying under kiddush ha-Shem,” or in other 
words, under “sanctification of the (Divine) Name” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
43. See, e.g., JEFFREY S. SHOULSON, MILTON AND THE RABBIS: HEBRAISM, HELLENISM 
& CHRISTIANITY 214 (2001) (stating that multiple rabbis were executed by Roman 
authorities for continuing to teach the Torah); VICTOR TCHERIKOVER, HELLENISTIC 
CIVILIZATION AND THE JEWS 364–65 (S. Applebaum trans., 1959) (describing the anti-
Semitic Hellenistic period where the Jews refused to worship Greek gods). 
44. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 40–47 
(Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1785). 
45. See id. 
46. See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, Clinical Loyalties and the Social Purposes of 
































regard as private and privileged.47  Similar issues arise in journalism:
from time to time, reporters go to jail rather than reveal the names of
sources to whom they have promised confidentiality.48 
IV. CONSCIENCE IN U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
There is no guarantee that any nation’s legal structure will reflect the 
core claims of conscience.  In this respect, among others, U.S. constitutional
history is fraught with ambiguity.  Madison’s original draft of what 
became the First Amendment would have protected “the full and equal 
rights of conscience.”49  By the close of the House debate, the language 
included protections for both the free exercise of religion and rights of 
conscience, implying a distinction between them.50  After moving back
and forth between these two formulations, the Senate ultimately selected 
religious free exercise, which became the language sent to the states for 
ratification.51 
On its face, this legislative history points unequivocally toward a 
single interpretation of the constitutional language.  Either the Framers 
viewed conscience and religion as coextensive, or they saw them as
different but opted to protect religion rather than conscience.  In either
case, claims of conscience lacking a religious basis would fall outside 
the realm of constitutional protection. 
If religious but not secular claims of conscience are potentially eligible
for constitutional protection, then legislators and courts have no choice
but to reach the questions of what religion is and what distinguishes it from
other comprehensive worldviews.  Given America’s religious demography
during the founding period, it would be natural for the Framers to regard 
belief in a “creator”—the source of transcendent rights and duties—as
the defining and distinguishing feature of religion.  But as the makeup of 
America’s population has become more diverse, especially in recent
47. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1016 (West 2014) for exceptions to normal
confidentiality rules in certain patient-therapist relationships.  One of the most famous 
patient-therapist confidentiality cases is Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 
where the California Supreme Court held that mental health professionals have a duty to
warn individuals who are being threatened with “a serious danger of violence” by a 
patient.  551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976).  The case arose when Prosenjit Poddar told his 
psychologist that he intended to kill Tatiana Tarasoff. Id. at 339.  Tarasoff did not receive any
warning about the threat, and Poddar later killed her. Id. at 339–40. 
48. See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Reporter Granted Release from Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 7, 2005, at A21; David Johnston & Douglas Jehl, Times Reporter Free from Jail;
She Will Testify, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at A1. 
49. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 34, at 434 (statement of Rep. Madison). 
50. See id. at 729–31. 
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decades, pressure on that definition has intensified.  Can the law really
draw a bright-line distinction between Christianity, Judaism, and Islam,
on the one hand, and Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism on the other?
Or would doing so eviscerate the robust religious freedom promised by
the First Amendment? 
It might seem more defensible to distinguish between worldviews 
based exclusively on reason and experience and those relying on revelation 
or a direct relationship with the divine.  But complications abound here 
as well.  After all, no less authoritative document than the Declaration of 
Independence characterizes certain truths as “self-evident,” including the
“Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God,” which the document proceeds to
spell out with considerable particularity.52  Although the Declaration has 
an unmistakably theological foundation, which some scholars characterize
as Deist rather than specifically Christian,53 its foundational truths are in
principle equally accessible to the reason of all human beings, regardless
of other creedal differences. In practice, how can the law distinguish 
between this religion of reason and other comprehensive views, such as
Kantianism, that claim an exclusively rational foundation for binding 
duties?  If we say that the Declaration’s rational religion includes a
“creator” in distinction to other reason-based views, we have returned to 
the problem of excluding non-Western creedal communities from the 
ambit of the Constitution. 
In light of these difficulties, it is not surprising that U.S. Supreme 
Court interpretation ended up moving toward a broader conception of 
conscience.  As early as World War I, an organization that would become
the American Civil Liberties Union unsuccessfully brought suit on behalf of 
individuals who conscientiously objected to military service on moral
52. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1–2 (U.S. 1776).  The full text of 
the Declaration of Independence is available in THE ANNOTATED U.S. CONSTITUTION AND 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 75–101 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2009). 
53. See AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 164 (John Lachs & Robert
Talisse eds., 2008) (stating that the same reason that permits the people to declare their 
independence by rational assertion in the Declaration of Independence allows Deistic 
thinkers to stand up to threats by religious leaders); Lori A. Catalano, Comment, 
Totalitarianism in Public Schools: Enforcing a Religious and Public Orthodoxy, 34 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 601, 629 (2006) (referencing one court that placed the Declaration of
Independence in a category of ceremonial Deism along with the Pledge of Allegiance 













     
    
  
 
   













rather than religious grounds.54  Nearly half a century later, during the
Vietnam era, this broader view prevailed.  Section 6(j) of the Universal 
Military Training and Service Act invoked the traditional view by making
draft exemptions available to those who were conscientiously opposed to
military service by reason of “religious training and belief.”55  The Act 
proceeded to define the required religious conviction as “an individual’s 
belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those 
arising from any human relation, but [not including] essentially political, 
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.”56  In
United States v. Seeger, however, the Supreme Court broadened the
statutory definition by interpreting the Act to include a “sincere and 
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the 
exemption.”57  Five years later, in Welsh v. United States, the Court further 
expanded the reach of the statute to include explicitly secular beliefs that 
“play the role of a religion and function as a religion in the registrant’s 
life.”58 Thus, the Court argued, exemptions could be extended to “those
whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious
beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to
become a part of an instrument of war.”59 
V. THE CASE AGAINST CONSCIENCE
For about two decades, U.S. constitutional jurisprudence occupied one 
of the four boxes in my figure—a wide conception of conscience, coupled 
with strong claims of conscience. But during that period, doubts grew 
about the entire enterprise of offering religion or conscience-based
exemptions and accommodations from generally valid statutes. 
We have already seen the jurisprudential result of these reservations.
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court rejected the claims of
individuals who invoked the Native American practice of sacramental 
peyote-smoking as a defense against Oregon’s controlled substances law.60 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia declared that “[a]ny society 
54. See, e.g., Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389–90 (1918); see also 
Brian Niiya, American Civil Liberties Union, DENSHO ENCYCLOPEDIA (last updated Apr.
5, 2013, 3:21 AM), http://encyclopedia.densho.org/American_Civil_Liberties_Union/
#.U2K4Abv4ieY.email. 
55. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1964). 
56. Id. 
57. 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965). 
58. 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970) (defining the meaning of the Seeger Court’s reference 
to the registrant’s “own scheme of things”). 
59. Id. at 344. 































    
 
 
[VOL. 51:  1, 2014] Accommodate the Claims of Conscience? 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
adopting such a system would be courting anarchy” and that this danger 
“increases in direct proportion to the society’s diversity of religious
beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them.”61 
Within very broad limits, legislators are free to enact such exemptions and
accommodations as they see fit.  But individuals may not claim them as
a matter of right under the First Amendment.  The majority acknowledged 
the risks their holding entailed: “It may fairly be said that leaving
accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage
those religious practices that are not widely engaged in . . . .”62  But this
outcome represents the lesser evil, and the Court said it “must be preferred 
to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself.”63 
From a philosophical point of view, however, these constitutional stances
are hardly dispositive.  That is why Brian Leiter, the author of a recent 
book titled Why Tolerate Religion?, begins with what he calls the “central
puzzle”—why the state “should have to tolerate exemptions from generally 
applicable laws when they conflict with religious obligations but not with
any other equally serious obligations of conscience.”64  A satisfactory 
answer would have to show, first, that there is a distinction between
religious and nonreligious conscience, and second, that this difference is
such as to warrant disparate state treatment.  And if we conclude that
there is no fundamental difference between religious and secular claims,
it remains to decide whether those claims deserve any deference when they
contradict generally valid law—recall the two-by-two figure with which 
we began.65 
Leiter suggests that two things single out religion from other modes of 
belief.  First, beliefs issue in “categorical” demands that must be satisfied
“no matter what an individual’s antecedent desires and no matter what
incentives or disincentives the world offers up.”66  Second, beliefs do not
ultimately answer to evidence and reasons as ordinarily understood:
“Religious beliefs, [by] virtue of being based on ‘faith,’ are insulated from
ordinary standards of evidence and rational justification . . . we employ
61. Id. at 888. 
62. Id. at 890. 
63. Id. 
64. BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 3 (2013). 
65. See supra Figure 1 and note 7. 
66. See LEITER, supra note 64, at 34 (emphasis omitted). 
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in both common sense and in science.”67 Religion is distinctive in
conjoining these two features of belief. 
The second feature is more controversial than Leiter suggests.  
Theologians in more than one religion would deny that all significant 
tenets of their creed are based on modes of belief impervious to evidence
and argument as ordinarily understood.  Every religion that rests on a 
historical narrative is exposed to the possibility of discoveries that may
challenge its core beliefs.
The first feature of religion—categorical demands that contradict
public law—is, I believe, the heart of the matter.  In agreement with both 
the Supreme Court and the facts of human life, Leiter argues that the
experience of being categorically commanded “does not track religious 
belief.”68  “Here stand I. I can do no other” can be a sincere secular claim.69 
The Supreme Court was not wrong to recognize the claims of secular 
creeds that “play the role of a religion and function as a religion in . . .
life.”70  Nor was the Court wrong to see religion as the paradigm for such 
claims. 
But at least religion identifies the source of the command and specifies
the content of the command in ways that can be verified.  When Quakers
say that they cannot engage in armed conflict, or Jews that they cannot 
worship idols, they can point to the core texts and settled practices of 
their faith as proof.  Religion offers conscience a measure of public
objectification.  Individualized claims of conscience detached from religion 
are harder to assess.  That does not mean that they should be dismissed
outright.
Still, inquiries into such claims are bound to be risky and intrusive.
The external indicia of sincerity are less than reliable.  And if courts try
to reason from the credibility of belief to the sincerity of the believer,
many religions would fail the test.  By definition, all miracles defy the 
laws of nature, and it is hard to see what makes one purported miracle
more or less credible than the next.  Surely courts cannot “grandfather” 
religions whose miracles have been long and widely accepted while 
subjecting newer faiths to stricter scrutiny.
Let me set questions of proof aside and return to the main thread. 
Leiter argues, and I agree, that conscientious claims include but extend 
beyond religion and that honoring only religious claims is indefensible, 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 132. 
69. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 432 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 
1992) (quoting Martin Luther). 
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at least on the plane of principle.71  We agree that conscientious claims
should be treated equally.  But we disagree about what that uniform 
treatment should be.
If I understand Leiter correctly, he endorses a generalized version of 
the position Scalia espoused in Smith: As long as the state is pursuing 
generally valid public purposes and is not directly targeting or burdening 
claims of conscience, it need not accommodate conscientious claims for
exemptions from the law.72  And, Leiter adds, it must not do so if
accommodation would have the effect of transferring burdens to others
or of undermining the law’s capacity to promote the common good.73 
The nub of the matter is this: Leiter believes that even when his two
conditions—no transferring of burdens and no impeding the common 
good—are satisfied, the state has no obligation to accommodate 
conscientious claims.74  I disagree. Unless the state can credibly argue
that making an exception for sacramental wine or sacramental peyote
violates one of Leiter’s conditions—and I do not think it can—the 
inherent moral weight of allowing individuals to act in accordance with
their deepest convictions should trump the application of the law to
those with conscientious objections against it; all the more so when the 
law prevents believers from practicing core rituals of their faith.  If free 
exercise means anything, surely it means that. 
But what of the fear that recognizing claims of conscience invites 
anarchy?  My response is simple: in the real world, claims of conscience
have not had, and will not have, the consequences the objectors fear.
The law is capable of establishing templates to distinguish between real 
and spurious claims, and courts and agencies are capable of applying 
them.  Even when the stakes are very high, as they are in wars of total 
mobilization, authorities are able to accommodate conscientious claims
without undermining military effectiveness.  And consistent with specific 
accommodations, states may legitimately require those receiving 
accommodations to perform alternative services that compensate for
71. See LEITER, supra note 64, at 93. 
72. See id. at 99–100; see also Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990)
(reasoning that the right of free exercise does not allow an individual to refuse to comply
with a valid and neutral law and precisely because the United States values and protects
religious divergence, the Court cannot deem as presumptively invalid every regulation
that does not protect a particular interest of the highest order). 
73. See LEITER, supra note 64, at 100. 






















whatever burden may have been shifted.  Given the risks and costs of
seeking accommodations—the time and money needed to meet strict
tests, plus the likelihood of social disapproval—it is no wonder that 
relatively few people choose to run the gauntlet, or that those who do are 
typically committed and sincere.  This is not anarchy, unless every limit
to state authority implies anarchy, in which case liberal democracy is by
definition anarchic.
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the end, it seems to me, the matter boils down to a single issue. 
Many individuals consider themselves bound by two sources of
authority—public law and conscience—whose demands do not always
coincide. Is the state prepared to take cognizance of this fact, and if so, 
how should it respond? 
Unlike other regimes, liberal democracies should not find these questions
unduly challenging.  To be a liberal state is to recognize limits on the 
legitimate scope of public authority; to be a liberal democracy is to
recognize limits on the authority of the people and on the writ of law 
enacted by majorities.  And it was the clash between civil law and religion 
that gave rise to the idea of limited public authority.  The claims of
conscience found—and continue to find—their place within the space 
this limitation opened up. 
The same logic points to the limits of conscientious claims, however,
and in particular cases, the weight of fact and argument may fall on the 
side of denying those claims.  The point is that the state may not rightly
assume that its claims are trumps in every case, any more than individuals
may assume that their claims are dispositive. 
I conclude by returning to my figure.  The correct quadrant is in the 
upper right—a wide conception of conscience that entails strong but 
rebuttable claims for accommodation.75  That is where the law of the United 
States stood four decades ago.  In my judgment, the philosophical as well as 
practical reasons for returning the law to where it stood are compelling. 
And we can do so without either legitimating unfairness or courting 
anarchy.
75. See supra Figure 1. 
18
